Abortion and Responsibility: Facing the Consequences of Choice

My opposition to abortion rests on a principle we apply almost everywhere else in life: responsibility follows from foreseeable consequences. We accept this logic in contexts ranging from driving to property ownership, yet abandon it when the subject turns to sex and pregnancy. Abortion debates often centre on choice, but rarely on what responsibility means once a choice has been made.

I am well aware of the immediate criticisms this position attracts, including cases of rape, intoxication, failed contraception, or the argument that a fetus is “only a cluster of cells.” These objections deserve consideration and they are not ignored here. 

Responsibility does not disappear because an outcome is unintended or inconvenient. Driving a car carries the risk of accidents, even for careful drivers. Owning property comes with obligations, even when damage is accidental. Risk does not absolve rather it creates duty.

Abortion is often framed as an act of care, not avoidance of responsibility, like treating injuries after a car accident. Compassion matters, but medical care does not negate responsibility, it acknowledges. We help people without pretending consequences never occurred. In contrast, abortion ends the life created by the choice itself, resolving difficulty by ending the life that resulted from the choice itself.

When a couple knowingly engages in unprotected sex, pregnancy is not some freak accident, it is a foreseeable outcome. Contraception reduces the risk, but it does not eliminate it. Failure is built into the equation, and everyone knows it. In most areas of life, we accept responsibility for predictable outcomes regardless of intention. Sex should not be treated as the lone arena simply because the consequences are inconvenient.

Biological Questions

Much of the abortion debate hinges on biology: is an early fetus “just a cluster of cells” or a fully developed person? Biologically, early human life is undeveloped, starting as a cluster of cells that will grow into a fetus. But development is a process, not a switch. Even in these early stages, responsibility arises from the life created through human action. The absence of full personhood does not negate the responsibility.

Autonomy matters. Control over one’s body is foundational. But pregnancy is not a case of autonomy operating in isolation. It involves a dependent life created through voluntary action, one that cannot advocate for itself. The question is not whether autonomy matters but whether autonomy alone is sufficient to override responsibility for the life one has caused to exist.

As Ronald Reagan once noted, “I’ve noticed that everyone who is for abortion has already been born.” His words underscore the ethical tension: the unborn, though voiceless, are the ultimate stakeholders in the choices we make.

Legality and Inequality
Abortion laws affect people unequally. Wealthier individuals often have greater access to options such as going abroad for legal abortion which raises questions about social inequality. However, this disparity does not render laws meaningless. We do not legalise harmful conduct simply because some people can evade consequences. Laws exist to set societal standards even if enforcement is imperfect.

Sexual violence
The argument for responsibility rests on consent. In cases of such sexual violence such as rape, the foundational element of choice and responsibility is absent. Many legal systems treat rape and incest as exceptions such as the United Kingdom and Germany that otherwise restrict abortion. Not because the unborn life suddenly loses all value but because responsibility cannot be assigned to victims of violencewhere consent never existed. At the same time, requiring victims to prove sexual violence as a condition of access to abortion risks retraumatiation and injustice.

Intoxication
Intoxication further complicates the question of responsibility. Voluntary intoxication does not erase foreseeable consequences. We do not excuse harmful conduct simply because someone chose to impair their judgment. At the same time, intoxication that removes the capacity to consent fundamentally alters moral responsibility. Where meaningful consent is absent, responsibility cannot be assigned in the same way. Treating all cases of intoxication the same blurs this critical distinction and weakens the honest debate.

At its core, the abortion debate is not merely about autonomy or biology but about whether responsibility retains meaning once choice has been exercised. We accept, almost everywhere else in life, that foreseeable consequences generate duties even when outcomes are unintended or burdensome. The question is not whether abortion is complex or tragic, but whether responsibility is a principle we genuinely uphold—or one we quietly discard when it demands too much.